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Abstract—Passive operating system fingerprinting reveals
valuable information to the defenders of heterogeneous private
networks; at the same time, attackers can use fingerprinting to
reconnoiter networks, so defenders need obfuscation techniques
to foil them. We present an effective approach for passive
fingerprinting that uses data features from TLS as well as
the TCP/IP and HTTP protocols in a multi-session model,
which is applicable whenever several sessions can be observed
within a time window. In experiments on a real-world private
network, our approach identified operating system major and
minor versions with accuracies of 99.4% and 97.5%, respectively,
and provided significant information gain. We also show that
obfuscation strategies can often be defeated due to the difficulty
of manipulating data features from all protocols, especially
TLS, by studying how obfuscation affects our fingerprinting
system. Because devices running unpatched operating systems on
private networks create significant vulnerabilities, their detection
is critical; our approach achieved over 98% accuracy at this
important goal.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private internal networks face many threats, including at-
tacks from external devices [5], infected internal devices [24],
and unauthorized devices [1], [25]. One important defensive
tool is passive operating system fingerprinting, which iden-
tifies the OS of a host solely through the observation of
network traffic. This class of techniques originated nearly two
decades ago as a way to understand remote devices sending
network attack traffic [21], and was rapidly embraced by the
open source community [27]. Passive OS fingerprinting was
then further developed by the research community. Lippmann
et. al. [16] introduced the idea of near-match fingerprints, used
machine learning classifiers to generate them, and determined
the OS categories that are identifiable via fingerprinting. Tyagi
et. al. [23] used passive OS fingerprinting of TCP/IP to detect
unauthorized operating systems on private internal networks.
Because vulnerable OS versions are typically present on pri-
vate networks [3], another important use of OS fingerprinting
is the detection of outdated versions containing vulnerabilities.
The data features originally used in fingerprinting were
from TCP/IP headers, but more recent work has made use
of features from HTTP headers [19], [26] and unencrypted
fields from the TLS/SSL handshake [8], [14]. These features
can be analyzed independently when only a single session’s
data is available, which is not uncommon in some scenarios.
In other scenarios, such as passively monitoring an internal
network, multiple sessions can be observed, and it pays to
utilize features accumulated over time from multiple protocols.
Although it is beneficial for network administrators to
use passive fingerprinting to identify operating systems on
their network, attackers have also embraced these techniques
to search for potential victims. Because of concerns around
this malicious use of identification, defenders have sought
ways to use obfuscation to defeat the technique, e.g., by
rewriting the fields in network headers [2]. These techniques
can obfuscate individual sessions or raw data features that a
user controls, but they are less successful in the multi-session
model, as it is uncommon for a user to have the ability to
rewrite all possible network protocols being sent from their
device. For example, rewriting TLS metadata can result in
failed sessions if the client does not support the rewritten
cipher suites, or, as is common in an enterprise setting, a user
may not have the appropriate device privileges to modify the
installed applications or libraries. This lack of control is a key
assumption we make when evaluating our multi-session model
in the presence of obfuscation.
A related technique is active OS fingerprinting, in which
one or more packets are sent to a device in order to trigger
an observable response. Shu and Lee [22] formalized passive
and active fingerprinting and developed the Parameterized Ex-
tended Finite State Machine (PEFSM) to model behavior when
multiple messages are sent and received. Greenwald et. al. [13]
studied active fingerprinting, and showed that information gain
can be used to minimize the number of probes that are needed.
The work presented in this paper is strictly passive; these
techniques are less disruptive to networks and applications,
are easier to integrate into network monitoring workflows, and
they allow for retrospective detection.
Fingerprinting has been generalized to characterize end-
point properties other than operating systems. Kohno et.
al. [15] used passive observations of the TCP Timestamp op-
tion to fingerprint individual devices based on their clock skew.
To passively fingerprint devices on Industrial Control System
networks, Formby et. al. introduced cross-layer response times
[10]. Other works have applied the idea to the identification
of particular protocols or applications, e.g., Conti et. al. [6]
fingerprinted attack tools. While we do not specifically address
application identification in this paper, the multi-session model
that we present is equally applicable because it is common for
applications to use multiple protocols.
A. Our contribution
While TCP/IP and HTTP features have previously been
used for passive OS fingerprinting, and TLS features have
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been used to fingerprint browsers, we describe the first system
that integrates all of these data types in a multi-session
model to identify the major and minor versions of operating
systems. This system accumulates data features within a fixed
time window, and applies a machine learning classifier to
utilize them. The inclusion of TLS features is crucial because
TLS-encrypted HTTPS sessions are increasingly used over
unencrypted HTTP sessions. We apply our system to real-
world network data collected over a period of 6 days. We
compute the information gain due to fingerprinting relative to
both single-session and multi-session data features, and show
that the latter provides practicable results: on our network,
it reduced the uncertainty per host from 2.41 to 0.13 bits.
Significantly, our system can distinguish between minor ver-
sions, e.g., OSX 10.12.4 versus OSX 10.12.3, with an
accuracy of 97.5%, achieving the fidelity needed to detect
vulnerable operating system variants. Finally, we evaluate the
multi-session model when a device obfuscates its raw features,
and show that the system maintains its accuracy even when
the majority of a protocol’s features are obfuscated.
II. FORMALIZATION
In this work, we consider only passive fingerprinting,
which we formalize as the process of assigning one or more
categories C from a set of categories C = {c1, c2, . . .} to some
observed network traffic based on a vector of data features
f = {f1, f2, . . .} by an assignment function a : F → C∗,
where F denotes the set of possible feature vectors or fin-
gerprints. Each category can be identified with a descriptive
label, such as OSX 10.11.6. A raw feature r ∈ R is a data
element that is extracted directly from a network packet. If
the assignment function is non-surjective, i.e., always returns
a single category for every possible f , it is called unique;
otherwise, the assignment function is called non-unique.
A fingerprinting scheme, (C, a), consists of a set of
categories together with an assignment function. Given a
fingerprinting scheme, (C, a), with a non-unique assignment
function, it is always possible to find a fingerprinting scheme,
(C′, a′), with a unique assignment function, a′, such that each
category in C′ corresponds to one or more categories in C,
and the categories associated with a′(f) are exactly those
returned by a(f). In these terms, Lippman et. al. [16] found a
set of categories by merging raw operating system categories
that supports a unique assignment function for their features.
For instance, when fingerprinting COS, it may be impossible
to distinguish between BSD and OSX, and thus a unique
fingerprinting scheme must include the composite category
{BSD,OSX}. In general, C should contain all categories of
interest, even though it may not be possible to find a unique
assignment function.
A. Prior Probabilities and Maximum Likelihood
Before the fingerprinting process, the probability that a
particular category c will occur is given by the prior dis-
tribution P (C), where C is a random variable associated
with the unknown category. When the assignment function
in a fingerprinting scheme is not unique, and it is necessary
or desirable to work with a single category rather than a
set of likely categories or a distribution over categories, the
optimal strategy is to choose the most likely category c =
argmaxc∗∈a(f)p(c
∗). This maximum likelihood rule creates a
unique assignment function by selecting the category with the
largest probability from a composite category. For instance,
in most network environments p(OSX) > p(BSD) for mobile
computers, and thus OSX would be chosen by the maximum
likelihood rule.
B. Information Gain
Fingerprinting reduces the uncertainty by eliminating some
possibilities, and the information gained by a fingerprinting
process can be quantified by treating the actual category, c,
the fingerprint, f , and the set of categories returned by a(f),
as random variables. p(f | c) is the conditional probability
that fingerprint, f , will be observed given the category, c, and
p(c | f) is the posterior probability. When the assignment
function is unique, these probabilities are given by:
p(f | c) =
{
1 if c ∈ a(f)
0 otherwise,
(1)
p(c | f) =
{
P (c)
Nf
if c ∈ a(f)
0 otherwise,
(2)
where the normalization factor Nf =
∑
c∗∈a(f) p(c
∗) appor-
tions probability among all of the categories in a(f). The
second equation follows directly from Bayes’ rule. Before the
fingerprinting process, the distribution of categories is given
by the prior, P (C), and after observing a particular fingerprint,
f , the probability is the posterior as above.
The prior distribution captures all of the knowledge about
the probability with which categories occur. If there is little
uncertainty in that distribution, e.g., p(Windows) = 0.99,
then there is little information gained on average. Alter-
natively, if the prior distribution has high uncertainty, e.g.,
p(Windows) = p(OSX) = 0.5, then fingerprinting techniques
can offer a significant advantage. This intuition can be for-
malized in terms of Shannon entropy. Let C and F be ran-
dom variables representing the categories and the fingerprints,
respectively. Before fingerprinting is applied, the entropy of
the category distribution is H(C), and after fingerprinting is
applied, the entropy of the category distribution is H(C | F ),
where:
H(C) = −
∑
c∈C
p(c) log p(c) (3)
H(C | F ) = −
∑
f∈F
p(f)
∑
c∗∈a(f)
p(c∗|f) log p(c∗|f) (4)
The information gain of applying fingerprinting is then:
I(C;F ) = H(C)−H(C | F ) (5)
Equation 5 can be equivalently stated in terms of KL-
Divergence:
I(C;F ) =
∑
f∈F
p(f)DKL (p(c | f)‖p(c)) (6)
Data Type H(C) H(C | F ) I(C;F )
All - Multi 2.41 0.13 2.28
TCP/IP - Multi 2.48 1.36 1.12
TLS - Multi 2.47 0.31 2.16
HTTP - Multi 2.42 0.37 2.06
TCP/IP 2.44 1.42 1.02
TLS 2.56 0.74 1.82
HTTP 2.49 0.35 2.14
TABLE I: The information gain due to fingerprinting. The
“Multi” data types use the multi-session, windowed approach
described in Section V-B.
where DKL (p(c|f)‖p(c)) is the per-fingerprint information
gain, and is defined as:
DKL (p(c|f)‖p(c)) =
∑
c∗∈a(f)
p(c∗|f) log p(c
∗|f)
p(c∗)
(7)
III. RAW DATA FEATURES
Our experiments are based on three different types of
network data: TCP/IP, TLS, and HTTP. Table I provides an
overview of the information gain for each of the data types,
computed using Equation 5. The TLS and HTTP fingerprints
perform the best in our experiments, and this is reflected
in Table I. Here, H(C) is the empirical entropy estimate
based on the distribution of the data feature. The “Multi” data
types are included for completeness, and are constructed by
concatenating all fingerprinting information contained within
a 60 minute window and using a machine learning classifier
as described in Section V-B.
The protocol-specific data features have the following
form: an ordered list of elements, each of which is either a type
code or a (type code, string) pair. The type codes are unsigned
integers or distinguishing strings used in the protocol, which
we treat as categorical variables. The list is constructed by
populating its elements in the order in which the type codes
are observed in the session. For each protocol, there is a set
of type code values for which a string is obtained from the
observed packet and included in the list as a (type code, string)
pair; for all other type code values, only that code is included.
A. TCP/IP
The earliest passive OS fingerprinting schemes used fea-
tures from TCP/IP, such as the IP Time To Live (TTL) values,
the list of TCP option types, and the values of the Maximum
Segment Size (MSS) and Window Scale (WS) options. For
our experiments, we collected the TTL and the ordered list of
all TCP options associated with a TCP SYN packet. Repeated
options were allowed in the ordered list. We also included the
data for the MSS and WS TCP options in the ordered list. In
total, we found 61 unique TCP/IP fingerprints in our dataset.
B. TLS
The TLS protocol [7] has a complex set of protocol options
that can be chosen by the client. The TLS fingerprinting
features that we use are taken from the TLS ClientHello
HTTP Fingerprint Information
Gain
Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; 0.1494
Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; 0.1358
Intel Mac OS X 10.12; 0.1158
Microsoft NCSI 0.0023
WinHttpClient 0.0003
iPhone8,1/10.3.1 0.0001
TABLE II: A summary of the information gain due to in-
dividual HTTP fingerprints. All three high information gain
fingerprints are Firefox/52.0, but edited for clarity.
message and include the cipher suite offer vector, which is
an ordered list of cipher suite type codes, and the extensions
vector, which is an ordered list of extension type codes. Similar
to the TCP MSS/WS options, we collected the data associated
with the following extensions:
• supported_groups
• ec_point_formats
• application_layer_protocol
_negotiation
The supported_groups and ec_point_formats ex-
tensions [4], [12] provide the cryptographic parameters that
the client supports. The application_layer_protocol
_negotiation extension [11] provides an ordered list
of application-layer protocols that the client supports, e.g.,
HTTP/2, HTTP/1.1, etc. There were 1,054 unique TLS
fingerprints in our dataset.
C. HTTP
For the HTTP fingerprint, we only use the User-Agent
header value, with capitalization maintained. Most browsers
will include some informative string indicating the operating
system within the User-Agent, e.g., Windows NT 10.0.
As Table I illustrates, HTTP fingerprints had the most in-
formation gain in a single-session setting. Despite their high
information gain, User-Agent strings should be used with
caution because they are easy to manipulate, and, in most
cases, their modification would not cause failures. In our
dataset, there was a total of 1,848 unique HTTP fingerprints.
To provide some intuition about what characteristics a
fingerprint with high information gain has, Table II lists
examples of HTTP fingerprints with high and low normalized
information gain. These values were normalized by multiply-
ing the fingerprint’s probability, p(f), with the fingerprint’s
information gain (from Equation 7). The high information gain
features appear frequently within our dataset, and also have a
strong association with one or a few operating system types.
The low information gain features either appear infrequently
or are equally probable across a large number of operating
system types. Microsoft NCSI and WinHttpClient
both appear frequently in our dataset, but in different Windows
versions proportional to those versions overall probabilities.
iPhone8,1/10.3.1 is only seen with a single operating
system type, but also only appears once in our dataset.
Operating System Day0 Day1 Day2 Day3 Day4 Day5 Total
Win 10.0.1439 71 (264,405) 57 (172,005) 41 (147,410) 62 (201,390) 82 (251,789) 74 (225,285) 387 (1,262,284)
Win 10.0.1058 360 (1,315,011) 261 (1,483,997) 160 (1,259,831) 246 (1,782,281) 346 (1,583,422) 371 (1,654,996) 1,744 (9,079,538)
Win 6.3.960 1 (979) 1 (1,068) 0 (0) 1 (4,015) 0 (0) 2 (2,094) 5 (8,156)
Win 6.1.760 SP1 466 (2,350,465) 349 (2,614,222) 175 (2,648,420) 320 (2,489,747) 436 (2,582,081) 501 (2,462,193) 2,247 (15,147,128)
OSX 10.12.5 1 (2,283) 3 (1,582) 1 (846) 3 (7,908) 3 (8,706) 4 (13,637) 15 (34,962)
OSX 10.12.4 141 (384,379) 81 (322,412) 60 (435,924) 88 (489,643) 120 (444,859) 164 (657,403) 654 (2,734,620)
OSX 10.12.3 67 (139,407) 41 (174,649) 24 (198,534) 35 (165,888) 54 (106,140) 47 (99,044) 268 (883,662)
OSX 10.12.2 9 (8,258) 3 (15,133) 8 (25,441) 3 (3,296) 3 (4,885) 11 (9,659) 37 (66,672)
OSX 10.12.1 5 (14,343) 2 (9,767) 1 (19) 1 (4,368) 6 (16,072) 14 (30,967) 29 (75,536)
OSX 10.12.0 3 (38,337) 4 (51,953) 1 (16,165) 2 (21,736) 5 (12,385) 6 (11,183) 21 (151,759)
OSX 10.11.6 245 (617,126) 199 (986,109) 116 (743,465) 183 (896,880) 228 (874,516) 322 (868,068) 1,293 (4,986,164)
OSX 10.11.5 6 (20,357) 4 (47,055) 1 (719) 1 (108) 4 (953) 4 (3,256) 20 (72,448)
OSX 10.11.4 2 (7,691) 0 (0) 1 (17,502) 1 (10,071) 1 (7,511) 2 (9,905) 7 (52,680)
OSX 10.11.3 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (3,486) 4 (7,277) 1 (8,924) 0 (0) 6 (19,687)
OSX 10.11.1 1 (1,705) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1,705)
OSX 10.11.0 2 (305) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (14,596) 0 (0) 3 (14,901)
OSX 10.10.5 42 (159,741) 36 (145,468) 21 (171,763) 32 (169,626) 33 (99,781) 33 (175,077) 197 (921,456)
OSX 10.9.5 9 (12,581) 9 (6,763) 0 (0) 5 (5,541) 5 (4,244) 1 (2,249) 29 (31,378)
iOS 10.3.1 0 (0) 7 (2,662) 3 (286) 13 (2,590) 13 (4,238) 27 (4,438) 63 (14,214)
iOS 10.3 8 (1,982) 2 (1,209) 4 (1,346) 4 (600) 3 (1,402) 2 (595) 23 (7,134)
iOS 10.2.1 45 (18,423) 36 (13,808) 14 (6,581) 21 (7,296) 37 (18,266) 57 (20,838) 210 (85,212)
iOS 10.2 2 (143) 3 (447) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (297) 3 (699) 11 (1,586)
iOS 10.1.1 6 (4,077) 6 (1,755) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (340) 0 (0) 13 (6,172)
iOS 10.0.2 2 (554) 1 (1,224) 1 (75) 0 (0) 3 (828) 2 (73) 9 (2,754)
iOS 9.3.5 1 (155) 2 (273) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (199) 5 (627)
android 7.0 0 (0) 1 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (3)
Total 1,495 (5,362,707) 1,108 (6,053,564) 633 (5,677,813) 1,025 (6,270,261) 1,388 (6,046,235) 1,649 (6,251,858) 7,298 (35,662,438)
TABLE III: An overview of the diversity of operating systems in the network that we monitored. The number of unique hosts
as well as the number of flows is given as: hosts (flows).
OS Type Hosts Flows
Windows 4,383 25,497,106
OS X 2,580 10,047,630
iOS 334 117,699
Android 1 3
TABLE IV: A summary of the observed network activity by
major operating system types.
Similar to the previous data types, we did experiment
with a representation that included the full, ordered list of
HTTP headers and the data associated with the User-Agent.
This led to poor results, most likely because each HTTP
client can potentially have hundreds of unique lists of HTTP
headers, and there wasn’t enough data to properly condition
the models. For example, there were 138 unique HTTP header
combinations for a single Firefox/52.0, Win 6.1.760
SP1 User-Agent string.
IV. COLLECTION ENVIRONMENT
We monitored the Internet connection of an enterprise
network with ∼3,000 active endpoints for six days in April,
2017. The internal network was connected to WiFi-attached
hosts and the trusted (non-encrypted) interface of a Virtual
Private Network (VPN) concentrator. By accessing the logs of
the VPN concentrator, we obtained ground truth information
on the OS of the hosts using that device. The data features
described in Section III were obtained for each session using
an open source package that we extended for that purpose [17],
which monitors a SPAN port and stores a JSON record
of each session that includes all of the relevant features
from TCP SYN packets, TLS ClientHello messages, and
HTTP requests. The IP addresses and identifying usernames
contained within HTTP requests were anonymized, and the
anonymized/deanonymized IP address pairs were kept separate
from the network flow data as described in Section VII.
Approximately half of the endpoints on the enterprise
network were connected using a supported VPN client that
logs endpoint information to a central repository. Table III
provides an overview of the diversity of the operating systems
that we observed, as well as the number of hosts and network
flows for each operating system type. There were 26 unique
operating systems during the six day period, but some had
very little data, e.g., iOS 9.3.5. Despite the severe class
imbalance, the only OS type that we discarded in all of our ex-
periments was android 7.0. The dominant categories were
unsurprising: 1) Win 6.1.760 SP1 with 2,247 hosts and
15,147,128 network flows, 2) Win 10.0.1058 with 1,744
hosts and 9,079,538 network flows, and 3) OSX 10.11.6
with 1,293 hosts and 4,986,164 network flows. Table IV
summarizes Table III by combining major operating system
types.
Again, the endpoints for which we had ground truth
were all using a VPN client to connect to the enterprise
network. The VPN tunnel adversely affected the maximum
segment size, with the largest MSS observed being 1,260. This
undoubtedly limited the efficacy of the TCP/IP fingerprints,
and we view the TCP/IP results as a lower bound of the true
efficacy. We leave collecting additional datasets and further
analyzing TCP/IP fingerprints as future work. We did verify
that the VPN client and other relevant network proxies had no
effect on either the TLS or HTTP data features.
V. RESULTS
In all of our experiments, we use data from the first three
days of our dataset to train the operating system classification
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(a) TCP/IP, Accuracy=55.54%
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(b) TLS, Accuracy=76.39%
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(c) HTTP, Accuracy=87.41%
Fig. 1: Confusion matrices for the single session, argmax classifier.
models, and then use data from the last three days to test the
models. The operating system label set is taken from Table III,
but can have some variability in the different experiments due
to an insufficient number of relevant network flows appearing
in the training data. For example, if there were no HTTP
User-Agent strings from android 7.0 devices in the
training dataset, then we would omit the android 7.0 label
and any corresponding network traffic from the experiment.
We used a custom program when analyzing network
flows in isolation, and used the random forest module from
scikit-learn [20] when analyzing features accumulated
during time windows. Because of the highly imbalanced nature
of our dataset, confusion matrices are presented for the first
single and multi-session flow experiments to illustrate the
models’ ability to learn the minority classes. Each element
of the confusion matrix represents the number of samples
with label lt that are classified as label lp. Correctly classified
samples, lt = lp, are the diagonal elements, and misclassified
samples, lt 6= lp, are the off-diagonal elements. As a baseline,
a majority-class classifier would have ∼35% accuracy, and
a classifier that only correctly labels Win 6.1.760 SP1,
Win 10.0.1058, and OSX 10.11.6 samples would have
∼80% accuracy.
A. Single Session Model
In these experiments, we treated each flow and fingerprint
type as independent. The last three days of data were used for
testing, and if a network flow in that dataset had a fingerprint,
f , for the fingerprint type being analyzed, then we selected
the operating system with:
c = argmaxc∗∈a(f)p(c
∗|f) (8)
where p(c∗|f) was conditioned on the first three days of data
in our dataset.
We trained three single session classifiers, one for each
fingerprinting type, and Figure 1 presents the confusion matri-
ces for the TCP/IP, HTTP, and TLS fingerprints. Some classes
were not in the testing dataset, e.g., OSX 10.11.1, and those
rows will be blank in the confusion matrix. TCP/IP performed
the worse with a total accuracy of 55.54%. As Figure 1a
shows, TCP/IP almost exclusively separates the traffic into
Data Type Number of
Fingerprints
TCP/IP Fingerprints 1.72
TLS Fingerprints 10.25
HTTP Fingerprints 3.35
All Fingerprints 13.97
TABLE V: The average number of unique fingerprints ob-
served in each 60 minute window.
Win 6.1.760 SP1, the dominating Windows OS, and OSX
10.11.6, the dominating Mac OS.
Both TLS and HTTP had better performance, with HTTP’s
accuracy at 87.41%. TLS had some similar behavior to TCP/IP,
favoring Win 6.1.760 SP1, OSX 10.12.4, and OSX
10.11.6. HTTP’s performance is not surprising because 8
out of the 10 most frequent HTTP User-Agent strings
contained at least the major version number of the operating
system, e.g., 10.12 for Mac or 10.0 for Windows.
B. Multi-Session Model
In contrast to treating each network flow independently,
this experiment collects all fingerprints from an endpoint
within a 60 minute window, and then classifies that window.
We used a random forest model [20] to classify the windows,
and used grid search and cross-validation on the training data
to adjust the number of features per split and the depth of the
trees. We also adjusted the number of trees in the forest, with
75 trees being optimal for nearly all problems. To ensure that
the random forest had a minimal amount of training data for
a specific OS type, we removed any OS type that had fewer
than 10 active windows in the training dataset.
For each fingerprint type, we created a binary feature
vector by defining a feature for each unique fingerprint that had
at least 100 occurrences in the training dataset, and we set the
binary feature to 1 if the associated fingerprint was observed in
the window. We experimented with using a normalized count
of each fingerprint, but this led to slightly inferior results. The
TCP/IP feature vector had a length of 31, and, coincidentally,
both the TLS and HTTP feature vectors had a length of 292.
We also introduce a fourth model that leverages all available
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(a) TCP/IP, Accuracy=62.30%
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(b) TLS, Accuracy=93.67%
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(c) HTTP, Accuracy=87.69%
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(d) All, Accuracy=97.50%
Fig. 2: Confusion matrices for the multi-session, random forest classifier.
fingerprints by concatenating all three feature vectors; this
feature vector had a length of 615. Table V lists the average
number of unique fingerprints observed in each 60 minute
window. As one would expect, there are typically only 1-
2 TCP/IP fingerprints and 3-4 HTTP fingerprints. TLS had
the largest number of unique fingerprints in a window with
an average over 10. This was in part due to small changes
in the advertised extensions, but was mostly due to unique
cipher suite offer vectors, which indicates that several unique
applications are using TLS on the endpoint.
Figure 2 presents the confusion matrices and total accuracy
numbers for the four feature vector types. The multi-session
approach significantly improves performance for TCP/IP and
TLS, but provides similar performance to the single session
model for HTTP. HTTP’s performance was most likely due to
less informative fingerprints, e.g., Mac OS X 10.12, dom-
inating informative fingerprints, e.g., Mac OS X 10.12.2.
In the case of TCP/IP, all of the improvements are due
to better differentiation of Windows, which was more likely
to use multiple TCP window sizes in the same 60 minute
window. Using all fingerprints within a 60 minute window
most improved the TLS model, 76.39% → 93.67%, which
was due to the large number of unique fingerprints within a
given window. Unsurprisingly, using all feature types gave the
highest accuracy of the four models with 97.50%.
Figure 3 presents the effect of varying the window size
from 5 to 60 minutes on the classifiers’ performance. Both
TLS and TCP significantly improve as the window size
becomes larger, and start to plateau between 25 to 40 minutes.
“All” also steadily improves as the window size is increased,
95.67% → 97.50%. For reasons described above, HTTP’s
performance seems to be independent of the window size.
C. General Categories
While knowing the exact minor version number of an OS
is beneficial, knowing just the major version number can be
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Fig. 3: Accuracy given varying window sizes.
Classifier Original General
Categories Categories
Single, TCP/IP 55.54% 55.99%
Single, TLS 76.39% 79.19%
Single, HTTP 87.41% 93.42%
Multi, TCP/IP 62.30% 63.12%
Multi, TLS 93.67% 97.82%
Multi, HTTP 87.69% 94.99%
Multi, All 97.50% 99.40%
TABLE VI: General OS classifier accuracy.
sufficient in some scenarios, and a classifier that identifies
only the major version can obtain more accurate results. To
examine these trade-offs, we performed the same experiments
from the previous sections, but used a more general set of
categories. After removing infrequent classes, the full label
set was mapped to: {Win 10, Win 7/8, OS X 10.12,
OS X 10.11, OS X 10.10, OS X 10.9, iOS 10}.
Table VI summarizes the performance gains from using the
more general operating system categories. Most models and
data types show a significant improvement. TCP/IP has only
modest improvement, which is a result of misclassifying most
major versions as either Win 7/8 or OS X 10.11, similar
to the previous TCP/IP results. The windowed HTTP model
begins to show improvements over the single session model,
which is most likely due to the less informative fingerprints,
e.g., Mac OS X 10.12, not impacting the predicted label.
The windowed TLS model and the model that used all feature
types showed improvements over the original categories, and
had the most competitive accuracy numbers with 97.82% and
99.40%, respectively.
D. Detecting Vulnerable Operating Systems
Common vulnerabilities are collected and organized into
central repositories [18]. After a vulnerability is disclosed, it
is often quickly used to create exploits [3]. When network
administrators need to identify vulnerable endpoints, a detector
that can differentiate between vulnerable / not vulnerable is
adequate. Similar to Section V-C, we perform this experiment
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Fig. 4: Confusion matrix for the multi-session, All classifier
for vulnerable OS detection. Total accuracy was 98.05%
by modifying the label set. We created two “good” categories:
{Win, OS X} where Win = {Win 10.0.1439} and
OS X = {Mac OS X 10.12.5, Mac OS X 10.12.4}.
There were also two vulnerable categories for OS X and Win
that contained all other versions of those operating systems.
Figure 4 presents the confusion matrix using all data types
for this problem. The total accuracy of this model was 98.05%.
In the testing dataset, there were 7,083 Vuln Win, 2,407
Vuln OS X, 587 Win, and 1,045 OS X 60 minutes windows.
There were 75 false negatives and 142 false positives. If
false positives are an issue, cost-sensitive learning could be
employed [9].
E. Evasion
Although the intention of this paper is to present methods
that help network administrators defend and maintain a private
network, these results could be used by attackers to fingerprint
potential victims. In response to this threat, Albanese et. al.
presented tools to evade fingerprinting techniques that rewrite
fields in network headers [2]. We now assess the performance
of our system in the presence of such obfuscation techniques.
To test the feasibility of evasion, we developed and tested
a straightforward obfuscation strategy. We created an obfus-
cation mapping that mapped all Windows hosts to the most
prevalent Mac host, Mac OS X 10.11.6, and mapped all
Mac/iOS hosts to the most prevalent version of Windows,
Win 6.1.760 SP1. We maintained the original operating
system categories, but would modify the fingerprints that we
observed from a host to match those of the mapped host. The
target fingerprints were chosen probabilistically to match the
appropriate operating systems fingerprint distribution.
We make the assumption that the device owner can con-
trol different percentages of the outgoing data, e.g., a user
can typically choose their browser, but may not be able to
influence the HTTP client used by an anti-virus agent. To
mimic this assumption, we chose different percentages of a
host’s fingerprints to modify in a given 60 minute window,
ranging from 0% to 100% with a step size of 25%. While
more advanced obfuscation strategies may be possible, our
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Fig. 5: Accuracy of the classifiers based on sets of data features
and different levels of obfuscation.
tests highlight some of the key aspects of obfuscation against
fingerprinting that uses multiple data types in a multi-session
model. The training data and categories were unmodified.
Figure 5 illustrates the performance of the multi-session
classifiers when our obfuscation strategy is employed by all
endpoints in the test dataset. The classifiers for all indi-
vidual fingerprinting types show a substantial decrease in
performance by modifying as little as 25% of the test sam-
ple’s fingerprints. TLS has the least amount of degradation,
93.67% → 73.17%, which is again due to the large number
of TLS fingerprints in each 60 minute window. When all
fingerprint types are modified equally, “All” in Figure 5,
the classifier using all available data is robust against an
obfuscation level of 25%, 97.50% → 94.95%, but performs
poorly at an obfuscation level of 50% or higher.
We also tested the classifiers under the assumption that a
device can only modify one fingerprint type, e.g., the results
assuming that a device can only modify HTTP User-Agent
strings is labeled as “All (HTTP)” in Figure 5. Under this
assumption, the classifier using all three data types performed
almost identically to the baseline model up to an obfuscation
level of 75%. At an obfuscation level of 100%, the models
did begin to show some weaknesses. At this level, TCP
modifications had the most significant impact, decreasing
the accuracy to 75.93%. HTTP modifications had the least
significant impact, only decreasing the accuracy to 92.15%.
The key point is that only modifying one fingerprint type or
only modifying the fingerprints from certain applications will
not successfully obfuscate a fingerprinting system that uses
multiple, distinct fingerprint types over a long period of time.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
The results put forth in this paper, specifically Section
V-E, have several important implications related to the Se-
curity/Privacy trade-off. As our results show, if a user can
control 50% or more of all fingerprint data types coming their
device, evasion is possible. Unmanaged endpoints can reach
this threshold by using operating systems that allow TCP stack
modifications, only using carefully modified TLS libraries,
only using HTTP clients that allows users to have full control
over the User-Agent string and other headers, and keeping
the number of applications that may violate these rules to a
minimum. This level of control is nontrivial, but is possible if
a user is concerned about privacy or a sensitive device needs
to evade an attacker’s reconnaissance.
That level of flexibility is not always possible in an enter-
prise network environment. In this setting, passive operating
system detection can be used to identify vulnerable operating
systems that need to be updated or quarantined. Endpoints on
a corporate network often require particular operating systems
and a large set of pre-installed applications, e.g., an anti-virus
agent that a user cannot modify. In this situation, it is not
generally possible for devices to control at least 50% of the
fingerprints. The device could create a large number of unique
fingerprints, but this would be easily flagged as abnormal
behavior. Our methods would perform well for enterprise
network administrators that need additional visibility.
Unfortunately, our environment did not contain any Linux
endpoints, which was a side effect of the VPN client, which
we acquired ground truth from, not supporting Linux. We
conjecture that the data features that we collect would make it
possible to also distinguish Linux hosts with similar or higher
accuracies. For instance, there are a set of TLS libraries with
higher prevalence in Linux, e.g., GnuTLS, and there are also
descriptive User-Agent strings. Given a properly labeled
dataset with a sufficient number of target operating system
examples, our approach is easily extensible.
Additional future work could include modifications to the
data collection strategy that would allow one to gather labeled
data from internal endpoints, which would remove the TCP
MSS artifacts. In terms of feature pre-processing, we experi-
mented with two algorithms to create the feature vectors from
the individual fingerprints for the machine learning algorithms.
The first, which had superior results and was used in our
presented experiments, used any fingerprint that occurred at
least 100 times in the training dataset, and the second used
the top-N% of the fingerprints according to the fingerprints’
normalized information gain, where N ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 100}.
Neither of these algorithms include any semantics about the
specific feature types, e.g., Mac OS X 10.12 could have
high information gain, but lead to many false positives with
the 10.12 minor version numbers. It would be interesting to
explore more informative feature pre-processing metrics that
incorporate this type of domain knowledge. Finally, assessing
a number of different obfuscation strategies would help to
tighten the bounds on the classifiers performance in this
setting, e.g., alter the operating system obfuscation mapping
to point to obscure or multiple operating systems.
VII. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
While collecting and analyzing the data needed for our
experiments, we had to deal with highly confidential and
sensitive data. We took all possible precautions to maintain
the privacy of the end user, followed all institutional rules and
procedures, and obtained the appropriate authorizations. While
collecting the data, all IP addresses and enterprise user names
in HTTP header fields were anonymized via deterministic
encryption. To obtain ground truth about the operating system
types, a list of IP addresses were compiled from the full
dataset, sent to a secure machine, and then deanonymized to
facilitate querying the VPN logs for OS ground truth. The OS
types were then associated with the anonymized IP address
and a timestamp. The anonymized IP address/timestamp pair
was then sent back to the machine that performed the ex-
periments. The anonymized/deanonymized pairs were deleted
immediately after ground truth was determined.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Passive operating system fingerprinting generates useful
intelligence for network defenders. By using TCP/IP, HTTP,
and TLS features together in the multi-session model, accurate
fingerprinting is possible, even to the level of minor version
detection. A machine learning classifier can deal with the
multitude of data features effectively, and we have shown
that this approach provides better accuracy than single session
fingerprints. The inclusion of TLS fingerprints for operating
system identification is particularly important because HTTP is
being replaced with the TLS-encrypted HTTPS protocol, and
the traditional User-Agent strings will no longer be visible.
The multi-session model presented in this paper enables one to
easily add additional, distinct fingerprinting data types, which
we have shown to be an important characteristic of an effective
fingerprinting scheme.
Crucially, we demonstrated that a multi-session model
based on TLS, HTTP, and TCP/IP can identify vulnerable
operating systems with high accuracy, and that fingerprinting
can be robust even when faced with levels of data feature
obfuscation that could be seen on an enterprise network. In the
more general setting, the multi-session model’s combination
of disparate data types, along with the fact that some data
types are difficult to modify, allows the model to maintain
performance even when 75% of the features derived from
individual data types are obfuscated.
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